Mappings


	[Integration] [15288 mapping] [Other mappings]

Mappings from the Human-Systems model to other models

This page provides some tentative mappings from the HS model to other related models. It is intended that the number of mappings will be steadily increased, and that they will grow in validity.

The mappings are not full ISO dot table mappings; a simpler format has been adopted merely to check that the HS model covers all activities addressed by the other models, and to indicate the sort of profile that might be used if it was intended to migrate from the other models to the HS model.

Mappings are also provided at the ISO web site http://www.iso.ch/

UK MoD Acquisition Management System (AMS) Compliance

The AMS includes a number of Instructions relating to HFI. Whilst these are Authoritative Guidance rather than Mandatory, deviations from them need a written justification and audit trail. The table below maps the Human-System Lifecycle model (the basis of HFI Process Risk Assessment) to these Instructions. Processes indicated (HS.1.1) are considered the key indicators for compliance, processes shown with a green background are directly required for compliance, and processes shown (HS.1.1) are indirectly required for compliance.

HS.1 Life Cycle Involvement

HS.1.1

HS.1.2

HS.1.3

HS.1.4

HS.1.5

HS.2 Integrate Human Factors

HS.2.1

HS.2.2

HS.2.3

HS.2.4

HS.2.5

HS.2.6

HS.2.7

HS.2.8

HS.3 Human Centred Design

HS.3.1

HS.3.2

HS.3.3

HS.3.4

HS.4 Human Resources

HS.4.1

HS.4.2

HS.4.3

HS.4.4

CMA mapping

The USAF has developed a model termed CMA (Capability Maturity Assessment) with five levels of maturity, and a number of Key Process Areas (KPAs), goals and activities at each level. The different approach (though perfectly valid) to capability/maturity scales would make a detailed mapping somewhat messy, and so a simple mapping of general coverage has been done. L II, III, IV, V refer to the CMA maturity level, and P1, 2, 3 refer to the KPA's. Because CMA is focused on management, execution of technical processes is largely indirect. This means that there is an emphasis on HS.2 but that many apparent gaps are less real than appears in the table below. The HS model benefits from the option of being considered as an overlay to ISO 15288, which provides a number of underpinning processes (notably the 'project' processes). The self-contained nature of CMA means it needs to carry all these processes itself.

HS.1 Life Cycle Involvement

HS.1.1

HS.1.2

HS.1.3

HS.1.4

HS.1.5

HS.2 Integrate Human Factors

HS.2.1

LIIIP4

LVP1

HS.2.2

LIIIP3, 4, 5

LIVP1, 2

HS.2.3

LIVP2, 3

HS.2.4

LIIP1

LIIIP1

HS.2.5

LIIP3

HS.2.6

HS.2.7

LIIIP2, 4, 5

LVP1

HS.2.8

HS.3 Human Centred Design

HS.3.1

HS.3.2

LIIP2

HS.3.3

HS.3.4

HS.4 Human Resources

HS.4.1

HS.4.2

HS.4.3

HS.4.4

HFAM mapping

Work for the UK Health and Safety Executive by Nickleby has developed a Human Factors Assessment Method based on close working with the UK Offshore sector. This has 21 questions. The answers to each question have a number of points assigned to it as a weighting. The weighting for the most human-centred answer to each question is either 30, 6 or 3. The question numbers and their weighting have been mapped onto the HS model processes.

HS.1 Life Cycle Involvement

HS.1.1

9

10, 12, 14, 15

HS.1.2

HS.1.3

21

HS.1.4

HS.1.5

(20)

HS.2 Integrate Human Factors

HS.2.1

1

Â

HS.2.2

2, 5

HS.2.3

3

HS.2.4

2, 8

HS.2.5

8, 18

HS.2.6

4

HS.2.7

6, 11

7

HS.2.8

Â

HS.3 Human Centred Design

HS.3.1

9

10, 12, 14, 15

HS.3.2

17

HS.3.3

HS.3.4

19

HS.4 Human Resources

HS.4.1

HS.4.2

13, 16

HS.4.3

HS.4.4

HF Top Ten mapping

A Human Factors Top Ten was developed in conjunction with interaction of HSE-HID Land Division inspectors with UK chemical and allied industry major hazard sites and is presented at www.petroleum.co.uk/content/files/file375.doc. The mapping below is between the top ten issues and the processes most directly aimed at preventing them as presented. It is likely that a review of process risks (rather than operational risks) would be better at identifying the underlying processes that would provide most effective mitigation. The obvious differences between this and the HFAM mapping is probably due to a difference in perception of human factors and Human Factors.

HS.1 Life Cycle Involvement

HS.1.1

HS.1.2

HS.1.3

1

HS.1.4

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

HS.1.5

HS.2 Integrate Human Factors

HS.2.1

HS.2.2

HS.2.3

HS.2.4

HS.2.5

HS.2.6

HS.2.7

HS.2.8

HS.3 Human Centred Design

HS.3.1

HS.3.2

HS.3.3

5, 6, 8, 9, 10

HS.3.4

5

HS.4 Human Resources

HS.4.1

1, 7

HS.4.2

2, 4

HS.4.3

3, 7

HS.4.4

BS EN 614-1:1995 mapping

The above standard is called up by the UK Safety of Machinery Regulations. It has the title Safety of machinery - Ergonomic design principles Part 1. Terminology and general principles. In fact it mandates a Human Factors work programme. The mapping here places the task numbers for the work programme onto the HS model.

HEP&P mapping

HEB1, Human Engineering - Principles and Practices has been published by the G-45 Committee members of the GEIA and is a signficant development of MIL (H, STD, HDBK) 46855 Human Engineering Program Plan. As such it represents a consensus of established US Human Engineering practice. The mapping here is based on a late draft (11-17-01) rather than the final document. It places the paragraph numbers (with some interpretation where necessary) from the high level guidance onto the HS model. A more detailed mapping would be both possible and worthwhile, but this high-level mapping is considered sufficient to show the coverage of the two documents.

HS.1 Life Cycle Involvement

HS.1.1

1.1

HS.1.2

1.1

HS.1.3

1.1

HS.1.4

HS.1.5

HS.2 Integrate Human Factors

HS.2.1

1.9

HS.2.2

1.6

HS.2.3

1.4, 1.7

HS.2.4

1.2

HS.2.5

1.3

HS.2.6

HS.2.7

1.5, 1.8

HS.2.8

1.6

HS.3 Human Centred Design

HS.3.1

1.1.1

HS.3.2

1.1.1

HS.3.3

1.1.3

HS.3.4

1.1.4

HS.4 Human Resources

HS.4.1

HS.4.2

HS.4.3

HS.4.4